Photography of Wanja Wiese

Wanja Wiese

Wanja Wiese is currently a postdoctoral assistant researcher and lecturer in philosophy at Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Germany. His research centers on consciousness, mental representation, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.


Contact

wawiese@uni-mainz.de



PPP Contributions

Predictive Processing and the Phenomenology of Time Consciousness
Vanilla PP for Philosophers: A Primer on Predictive Processing

Wanja Wiese also contributed to Open MIND:
Perceptual Presence in the Kuhnian-Popperian Bayesian Brain

Publications

  • Wiese, W. (in press). Experienced Wholeness. Integrating Insights from Gestalt Theory, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Predictive Processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Wiese, W. (2016). Action is enabled by systematic misrepresentations. Erkenntnis. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-016-9867-x http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-016-9867-x

  • Wiese, W. (2016). How to solve the problem of phenomenal unity: finding alternatives to the single state conception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-016-9478-7 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-016-9478-7 (OPEN ACCESS)

  • Wiese, W. (2016). What are the contents of representations in predictive processing? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-016-9472-0 http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11097-016-9472-0

  • Wiese, W. (2015). Perceptual presence in the Kuhnian-Popperian Bayesian brain - A Commentary on Anil K. Seth. In T. Metzinger & J.M. Windt (Eds.) Open MIND: 35(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. DOI: 10.15502/9783958570207 http://open-mind.net/papers/perceptual-presence-in-the-kuhnian-popperian-bayesian-brain-a-commentary-on-anil-seth-wanja-wiese

  • Also in: Metzinger, T., & Windt, J.M. (Eds.) (2016). Open MIND, Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 1475-1493.

  • Wiese, W. (2014). Jakob Hohwy: The Predictive Mind. Minds and Machines 24(2), 233-237. DOI: 10.1007/s11023-014-9338-6.

  • Wiese, W., and Metzinger, T. (2012). Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness: First steps towards a formal model for the unity of consciousness. In S. Edelman, T. Fekete, and N. Zach (Eds.), Being in Time. Dynamical models of phenomenal experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.