@incollection{Bruineberg.2017, abstract = {This paper deals with the question of agency and intentionality in the context of the free-energy principle. The free-energy principle is a system-theoretic framework for understanding living self-organizing systems and how they relate to their environments. I will first sketch the main philosophical positions in the literature: a rationalist Helmholtzian interpretation (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013), a cybernetic interpretation (Seth 2015) and the enactive affordance-based interpretation (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. forthcoming) and will then show how agency and intentionality are construed differently on these different philosophical interpretations. I will then argue that a purely Helmholtzian is limited, in that it can account only account for agency in the context of perceptual inference. The cybernetic account cannot give a full account of action, since purposiveness is accounted for only to the extent that it pertains to the control of homeostatic essential variables. I will then argue that the enactive affordance-based account attempts to provide broader account of purposive action without presupposing goals and intentions coming from outside of the theory. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss how each of these three interpretations conceives of the sense agency and intentionality in different ways.}, author={Bruineberg, Jelle}, title = {Active Inference and the Primacy of the ‘I Can’}, url = {https://predictive-mind.net/papers/active-inference-and-the-primacy-of-the-i-can}, keywords = {Sense of agency, Active inference, Phenomenology, Skilled intentionality, Cybernetics, Affordances, Helmholtz, Free energy principle}, publisher = {MIND Group}, isbn = {9783958573062}, editor = {Metzinger, Thomas K. and Wiese, Wanja}, booktitle = {Philosophy and Predictive Processing}, chapter = {5}, year = {2017}, address = {Frankfurt am Main}, doi = {10.15502/9783958573062}}