The Problem of Mental Action - Predictive Control without Sensory Sheets Thomas K. Metzinger 1 Introduction: The Problem of Mental Action 2 What Is Mental Action? 2.1 Mental Action versus Mental Behavior 2.2 Mental Autonomy: Variable Degrees of Epistemic Self-Control 2.3 Mental Action Type 1: Volitional Attention 2.4 Mental Action Type 2: High-Level, Symbolic Cognition 2.5 The Phenomenology of Epistemic Self-Control: The EAM 3 Building Blocks for a Positive Model 3.1 Building Block 1: Attentional Agency under PP 3.2 Building Block 2: Cognitive Agency under PP 3.3 Building Block 3: The Convergence of Instrumental and Epistemic Action for the Special Case of Mental Action 3.4 Building Block 4: Epistemic Value 4 Open Questions 4.1 Problem 1: The Bubble in the Bubble 4.2 Problem 2: Dropping Naïve Realism About “Goals” 4.3 Problem 3: Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Mental Action 5 Conclusion